Many social commentators have raised concerns over the possibility that increased sorting in society can lead to greater inequality. To investigate this, we construct a dynamic model of intergenerational education acquisition, fertility and marital sorting and parameterize the steady state to match several basic empirical …ndings. We …nd that increased marital sorting will signi…cantly increase income inequality. Four factors are important to our …ndings: a negative correlation between fertility and education, a decreasing marginal e¤ect of parental education on children's years of education, wages that are sensitive to the relative supply of skilled workers, and borrowing constraints that a¤ect educational attainment for some low income households.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many social commentators claim that American society is becoming more strati…ed, in the sense that individuals are tending to interact more with others who are similar to themselves, and less with others who are di¤erent. These interactions include who one works with, who one marries, who one goes to school with, and who one has as neighbors. 1 Thus, increased strati…cation or sorting may take place along the dimensions of skills, income, education, aptitude, race and ethnicity.
Why might increased sorting matter? It has been hypothesized that increased sorting may reduce redistribution, increase negative activities such as crime, or reduce positive peer e¤ects in school. Some observers (e.g. Wilson [1987] and Reich [1991] ) have argued that increased sorting may have signi…cant consequences for the degree of inequality in society, with more sorting leading to greater inequality. A recent and provocative paper by Kremer [1997] , however, argues that the quantitative e¤ects of even very large increases in sorting-whether marital or residential-are likely to be negligible, at least as concerns the distribution of income and education.
The objective of this paper is to investigate in greater depth the e¤ects of increased marital sorting on inequality. 2 In order to do so, we examine a model of intergenerational education acquisition and marital sorting and parameterize it to match several basic empirical …ndings. We …nd that increased sorting may signi…cantly increase income inequality.
Our model is very simple. Individuals are either skilled (college educated) or unskilled (high-school educated). They meet, match and have children. Unable to borrow against future human capital, families decide how many of their children 1 Whether strati…cation or what we will generally call "sorting" has actually increased is a separate question and one that we will not investigate here. Kremer and Maskin [1996] present some evidence in support of the argument that sorting by skill level in the workplace has increased. Evidence on marital sorting appears mixed. Based on years of schooling, the evidence leads to the conclusion that sorting has not increased; however, the decreased probability that certain educational barriers will be crossed (e.g. high school graduate married to college graduate), suggests greater sorting (Mare [1991] ). Sorting at the neighborhood level by income (and controlling for racial and ethnic group) appears to have increased across all groups in US metropoloitan areas, but particularly for Blacks and Hispanics (Jargowsky [1996] ), whereas annecdotal evidence of increased tracking in schools and the proliferation of magnet schools suggests that sorting in schools may be increasing. 2 Throughout we use the term marriage to mean household matching independently of whether the couple is o¢cially married.
to send to college based on their family income, their children's abilities, and the expected wage di¤erential for skilled relative to unskilled labor. The distribution of education determines wages, and together they determine the distribution of income. We solve for the steady states of the dynamic model; perhaps not surprisingly, the existence of borrowing constraints generates multiple steady states.
The degree of sorting in this model is re ‡ected in the fraction of the population that gets perfectly (as opposed to randomly) matched with a partner. An increase in the degree of sorting can, in theory, either increase or decrease the skilled fraction of the population, depending on a number of factors that we discuss in our analysis. In our calibrated model we …nd that if marital sorting increases, then a smaller fraction of children will become skilled. This drives down wages for unskilled workers and increases those of skilled workers and also increases the degree of wage inequality. If as a result of lower wages, borrowing constraints become tighter for low-income families, the e¤ect on wage inequality is further magni…ed.
Contrasting our …ndings with that of Kremer's, we …nd three factors, all absent in Kremer's analysis (and, we argue, present in the data), to be central to our results. In particular, a negative correlation between fertility and education, a decreasing marginal e¤ect of parental education on children's years of education, and a process of wage determination that is sensitive to the relative supply of skilled to unskilled workers all contribute to our qualitative and quantitative conclusions.
In addition to the paper by Kremer, our work is related to several others in the literature. Bénabou [1996a] , Caucutt [1997] , Cooper [1997] , Durlauf [1995] , Epple and Romano [1996] and Rogerson [1996, 1997] examine the e¤ects of neighborhood and school sorting generated either endogenously by education policies or exogenously via increased neighborhood strati…cation. Banerjee and Newman [1993] , Bénabou [1996b] , Fernández and Rogerson [1998] , Galor and Zeira [1993] , Loury [1981] , and Ljungvist [1993] examine the e¤ects of the existence of borrowing constraints on the dynamic evolution of the economy and income inequality. The e¤ects of endogenous fertility on income distribution (and vice versa) have recently been the subject of analysis in Dahan and Tsiddon [1998] , Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles [1999] , and Kremer and Chen [1999] among others.
The outline of the paper follows. In the next section we describe the model and its steady states. In section III we analyze the e¤ects of changes in sorting. In section IV we use data to parameterize the model, and in section V we use our parameterized model to assess the e¤ects of a large increase in sorting. Section VI reviews Kremer's analysis and contrasts it with our own. Section VII examines the robustness of our results to alternative parameterizations and Section VIII concludes.
II. THE MODEL
To examine the e¤ects of marital sorting on the process of intergenerational education transmission and income inequality requires a dynamic model that incorporates marriage, fertility, education and the determination of income. The interaction of these factors easily yields a non-tractable model (see Greenwood, Guner and Knowles [1999] for a computational approach to this problem) so, wherever possible, we choose to model these decisions in as simple a way as possible, keeping many elements exogenous (in particular fertility and marriage decisions) in order to highlight the interactions that are central to our analysis. 3 The story our model tells is a simple one. In each period the adult population is characterized by a distribution of education or skill levels. We assume that individuals are either skilled or unskilled and that a competitive labor market determines the relative wages of these workers. These individuals meet and match with their household partner via an exogenous matching process that exhibits positive assortative matching. Couples have children and, based on the number of children, their aptitudes, family income, and expected wages, they decide the education levels of their children. This generates the next generation's distribution of education (skill levels). A more formal description follows.
A. Marriages
Consider a population at time t whose number is given by N t and some division of that population into skilled workers, N st , and unskilled workers, N ut , where:
For our purposes, skill levels will be synonymous with an educational attainment. All college-educated workers are skilled (s); all others are unskilled (u). 4 Each individual is matched with another, resulting in a "marriage" according to the following mechanical process. In order to capture the degree of sorting in the economy, we allow some fraction of marriages, say µ, to be perfectly matched, i.e., a skilled worker matches with another skilled worker or an unskilled worker matches with another unskilled worker. The remaining fraction of the population is matched in a random fashion resulting in homogamous and non-homogamous households. Thus marriages will belong to one of three categories: skilled matches with skilled (denoted by h for high type), skilled matches with unskilled (denoted by m for mixed or middle type), and unskilled matches with unskilled (denoted by l for low type). These categories will also correspond to the relative position of couples in the income distribution.
Given the degree of assortative matching µ and the distribution of the population at time t into skilled and unskilled, the total number of high-type matches at time t, h t , is given by:
and¯is the ratio of skilled workers in the population, i.e.,
The number of middle-type matches at time t is given by
whereas the number that are low type is given by:
Of course,¸h t +¸m t +¸l t = 1 and h t + m t + l t = N t 2 .
B. Fertility
Fertility probably depends on parental education, income, culture and technology among other things. We simplify matters by assuming that the probability distribution over fertility is determined entirely by the educational backgrounds of the parents. Thus, the probability of a family having a certain number of children, n, is a function only of marriage type and can be denoted by Á nj ,where n = f0; 1; 2; :::; ¹ ng and j = h; m, or l. We denote the average fertility for families
A child can be of two "aptitude" types which we denote by either high or low, the signi…cance of which will be made clear shortly. The probability that a given child is of high aptitude,°j, j = h; m; l is allowed to di¤er across family types but not across families within the same category. 5 Realizations are independent across children. The probability, therefore, that a family with a total number of children n has a · n children of high aptitude is°a j (1 ¡°j)
s the binomial coe¢cient (equal to the number of combinations of n things taken a at a time). 6 C. Education A family's decision to send a child on to college is determined by the child's aptitude, family income, and expected wages. If a child with high aptitude obtains a college education, we assume she receives one unit of skilled human capital, whereas a low aptitude child who goes on to college is assumed to obtain zero units of skilled human capital. 7 The quantity of unskilled human capital that a child obtains is assumed to be independent of her aptitude level, i.e., all individuals who obtain only a high-school education have the same level of human capital. The aptitude (and education) of a child is assumed to be perfectly observable to all. 5 In this sense perhaps the term aptitude is a misnomer since, strictly speaking it is not genetically determined (otherwise we would have to keep track of whether a couple included 0, 1, or 2 high-aptitude individuals). It is best thought of as a high or a low ability to obtain marketable skills from college. This ability is assumed to depend on parental education and hence di¤ers across family types. 6 Our speci…cation assumes that children's aptitude depends only on average parental education, and not on how this is distributed across the mother and the father. In developing countries there is some evidence to suggest that the mother's education is more important. However, in the context of the US, our assumption is consistent with the …ndings reported in Kremer [1997] . He found no evidence for di¤erential e¤ects betwen mother's and father's education. 7 We could easily assume that a low aptitude child ends up with ' < 1 units of skilled human capital. This would multiply the number of potential steady states we have to examine but not add any new factor of interest to our analysis.
We assume that the cost of sending a child to high school is zero whereas a positive (constant) cost, º, must be incurred before obtaining a higher education. To render the decision of whether to send a child to college as simple as possible, we assume that, subject to obtaining a minimum per capita consumption level of c, a family would always desire to send a high-aptitude child to college if the net return from doing so, w s ¡ º, exceeded the return from high school, w u . More formally, if a family with n children of which a are of high aptitude sends r · a of them on to college, and has per capita consumption equal to c; we assume they receive utility
where w s and w u are next period's wages for skilled and unskilled workers respectively. 8 We assume a constant returns to scale aggregate production function given by:
Assuming a competitive labor market, it follows that wages are determined only by the value of¯:
where the assumptions in (7) imply that skilled wages are decreasing in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers and the opposite for unskilled wages. Note that no family would want to send their child to college if the fraction of skilled workers exceeds¯, where¯is de…ned by:
We assume henceforth that¯is strictly positive. Note, furthermore, that¯would be the fraction of the population that would attend college if there were no borrowing constraints and, on aggregate, the fraction of high aptitude children exceeded .
D. Budget Constraints
The utility maximization problem of a family of type j with n children, a of whom are high-aptitude is given by the maximization of U as speci…ed in (6) subject to a budget constraint. Note that in the absence of any impediments to borrowing against future income, all high-aptitude children would attend college as long as¯·¯in the subsequent period. With borrowing constraints, however, household income is an important determinant of the number of children that a family can a¤ord to send to college.
In what follows, we assume that families are unable to access credit or insurance markets. 9 For interpretational purposes, however, we think that it is important to note that these borrowing constraints need not be thought of as constraining directly the capacity of a family to send a child to college (which is debatable as some colleges are close to free). 10 Instead, in a richer model the inability to borrow against a child's future income could serve to constrain a family's residential choice and consequently the quality of the high school their children can attend. 11 This would then a¤ect both the amount of human capital obtained from high school attendance and the probability that the child attends college.
Thus the utility maximization problem of equation (6) is subject to a householdincome budget constraint:
It is, of course, not necessary to shut down capital markets altogether in order to obtain the result we desire-that the maximum number of children a family can a¤ord to send to college is a function of family income. It is simple to write down micro-foundations (e.g., moral hazard or imperfect enforcement technology) for this or less extreme assumptions (see, for example, Ljungvist [1993] , Banerjee and Newman [1993] , or Galor and Zeira [1993] ). Note also that families would want to pool risk since the number of high aptitude children each has is stochastic. 10 Although, of course, there are subsistence costs to be met, etc. Indeed Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman [1989] argue that unequal access to …nancing for college can help explain di¤erences in educational attainment. 11 For a model that examines the consequences of local provision of education in which the cost of housing in a wealthy community prevents lower-income individuals from accessing highquality primary and secondary education, see Fernández and Rogerson [1998] .
where
Note that a higher fraction of skilled workers implies lower wages for skilled workers and higher ones for unskilled workers. Hence, an increase in¯implies tighter budget constraints for high-type families and looser ones for low-type families. Whether the budget constraint for middle-type families is loosened or tightened depends on whether the increase in the wage of unskilled workers is greater than the accompanying decrease in skilled wages, i.e., on whether N s ¡ N u is positive.
E. Steady States
It is straightforward to show that if¯t is the fraction of the population that is skilled in period t; then next period's value of¯is uniquely determined. The dynamic evolution of this economy will of course depend on the fertility of each family type, the fraction of children of each type that are of high aptitude, wages, minimum required consumption, and the cost of college.
Though the economy will follow a unique path starting from any initial condition, in general this economy may have multiple steady states. To see why this is the case, note that the fraction of skilled workers in the economy determines the income level for each marriage type, which in turn determines who can a¤ord to attend college. A higher fraction of skilled workers implies a higher wage for unskilled workers and a lower one for skilled workers. This tightens constraints for high-type families, loosens constraints for low-type families and loosens (tightens) them for middle-type families if¯>(<) 0:5. Thus, a low initial proportion of skilled workers can be reinforcing if as a consequence of low unskilled wages a large fraction of families …nd themselves constrained. Similarly, a high initial proportion of skilled workers can be reinforcing if as a consequence of high unskilled wages a small fraction of families …nd themselves constrained. This positive feedback e¤ect can give rise to multiple steady states.
Suppose that in equilibrium a family of type j can a¤ord to send z nj of their n children to college (and …nd it desirable to do so). To solve for the fraction of children that type j families will send to college in aggregate, ¡ j (z j ), z j = (z 1j ; :::; z ¹ nj ) requires …nding the distribution of high-aptitude children over type j families and evaluating which of these are constrained. In particular, we have
(12) where the …rst summation term within the square brackets is the number of children that attend college from families of type j with n children that are not constrained (as the number of high-aptitude kids they have is fewer than z nj ) and the second summation is over the number of children that attend college from constrained families of type j with n children. 12 The steady states of the economy are the …xed points of the dynamic system below:¯t
i.e., a b such that¯t +1 =¯t = b . Note that each z j must be consistent with the equilibrium family budget constraint (i.e., 8n s.t.
and, of course, parents must wish to send their children to college, i.e., b ·¯: We will restrict our attention to locally stable steady states, and thus impose
< 1 as an additional constraint.
III. CHANGES IN SORTING
How will a change in the degree of sorting (i.e., in the level of µ) a¤ect the steady-state level of¯? In answering this question it is useful to distinguish two cases: one in which the change in sorting does not a¤ect the maximum number of children any family type can a¤ord to send to college and the other in which it does. In the …rst case what we will call the "bindingness" of borrowing constraints is not a¤ected; in the second case it is. 13 12 If a family of type j with n children is not constrained, we simply indicate this by z nj = n. 13 In a model with a continuous income distribution, there would always be a change in the bindingness of borrowing constraints for some families (as long as some of them were constrained in the initial equilibrium). Thus this second channel would always be present. In our discrete model, whether constraints become more binding depends on the cost of college relative to family income. Thus, small changes in sorting may not a¤ect the extent to which families are constrained.
Assume initially that the bindingness of constraints is not a¤ected (i.e., assuming that the z j 's do not change and hence that the ¡ j 's are constant). Using the implicit function rule on (13) yields:
Taking the derivatives of the¸j's (given by (2), (4) and (5)), evaluating at = b , and substituting into the expression above yields:
It is easy to show that local stability requires:
implying that D is positive. Note that one way to think about what an increase in sorting does is that for every two middle-type marriages it destroys, it creates one high and one low-type marriage. With this in mind, note that an interpretation of (15) is that increased sorting increases the steady-state fraction of the population that attends college if the result of substituting two middle types by one high and one low type on net increases the number of children that attend college by more than what would result from that same substitution and all three types sending a fraction b of their children to college.
It is easy to evaluate (14) or (15) in a few special instances. Consider …rst the case where the ¡ j 's are constant across family types, i.e., ¡ j = ¡; 8j. Then, by (13) , b = ¡, and a change in the degree of sorting has no e¤ect on the fraction of the population that attends college and hence on wages and on the personal income distribution(e.g., if all family types send 10 percent of their children to college, the steady-state fraction of the population that attends college is 10 percent, irrespective of the degree of sorting). 14 Next consider the case where the ¡ j 's are not identical but where average fertility is constant across family types, i.e., f j = f. In such case the sign of (14) is given by the sign of ¡ h + ¡ l ¡ 2¡ m . The intuition behind this is simple given the earlier observation: Since average fertility is the same across family types, the e¤ect of increased sorting depends on whether the fraction of children sent to college on average by two middle-type marriages (2¡ m ) is smaller than the combined fraction of children that go to college on average in one high and one low type family (¡ h + ¡ l ). Thus, if the relationship between parents' education and children's education is linear, changes in sorting will have no e¤ect on b ; if concave increases sorting will decrease b and the reverse if the relationship is convex.
Another case for which it is relatively easy to derive an expression is for
In this case, after manipulating (15) , it is easy to see that the sign of the e¤ect of an increase in µ is given by the sign of
. This is an interesting case since it implies that if both fertility and the probability of attending college are linear in parents' average years of education, the e¤ect of increased sorting is to decrease the fraction of the population that attends college if children of high-type parents have a greater probability of attending college and if the fertility of low-type parents is greater than that of high types. This points out that although every individual relationship can be linear, what matters is a non-linear combination of the two relationships, which can give rise to non-linearities.
Lastly, it is useful to note from (15) that a su¢cient condition for increased sorting to impact negatively on b is for f h ¡ h ¡2f m ¡ m +f l ¡ l · 0 and f h +f l ¡2f m0 (with at least one inequality strict). The …rst expression captures whether the number of children that on average attend college is increased or decreased by substituting two m couples by an h and an l. Thus, it indicates by how much the population that attends college would increase given this substitution. The second expression captures the amount by which the population as a whole is increased or decreased by substituting two m couples by an h and an l. Obviously, a decrease in the population attending college will, ceteris paribus, serve to reduce b ; as will an increase in the overall population (since it dilutes further the gain/loss of the …rst term). As we shall see further on, our parameterization implies that both inequalities hold strictly and hence that increases in sorting decrease the fraction of the population that goes to college.
As mentioned previously, the degree of sorting can also a¤ect the steadystate level of b via its e¤ect on the tightness of borrowing constraints. To see this, suppose that keeping all z j 's constant as before, an increase in µ decreases b . This smaller proportion of skilled workers is associated with lower unskilled wages and higher skilled wages. The change in wages will increase family income for high types and decrease it for low types, and thus may lead to less binding constraints for the …rst group and tighter ones for the second. Should this happen, the original equilibrium values of the z j 's and hence of the ¡ j 's would no longer be feasible and b would change as a result. That is, a change in the degree of sorting can a¤ect the feasibility (in steady-state equilibrium) of di¤erent values of z's.
IV. PARAMETERIZING THE MODEL
In this section we parameterize our model. We choose parameters so that the cross-section data generated in a steady state of the model are consistent with cross-section relationships in actual US data. This ensures that the reduced-form relationships implied by this steady state of the model are "reasonable".
Many of our relationships will be based on a sample of individuals from the PSID. We construct a sample that matches parents and children by selecting all individuals over 25 in the 1993 PSID whose parents were in the PSID in 1968, and for whom we have data on educational attainment. The resulting sample size is 645 parental units and 1385 children. We split this sample into skill categories by counting all individuals with high school or below as unskilled, and all individuals with some college or above as skilled.
Recall that in the model there are three types of marriages-high, middle and low-which di¤er in both the average education and the average income of the couple. Each type of marriage j is further characterized by two statistics: Á nj , the fraction of families of that type that have n children, and°j, the fraction of children (on average) from that marriage type that have the aptitude to bene…t from skill acquisition. These two pro…les are central to our analysis, so much of our discussion will focus on them.
It is empirically well-established that fertility rates are negatively correlated with both income and education. To calibrate our fertility pro…les we use the fertility rates for the parent portion of our PSID sample. We use the parents since the children do not have completed fertility pro…les. For our sample the average number of children from high, middle and low type families is equal to 1:84, 1:90, and 2:26 respectively. In each case we assume that families of a given type have realized fertility corresponding to the two integers that bracket the actual fertility rate, with the probability of obtaining a given integer speci…ed so as to match the average fertility rate for that family type. This gives Á 1h = :16; Á 2h = :84, Á 1m = :10; Á 2m = :90, Á 2l = :74; Á 3l = :26, and all other Á nj 's are equal to 0.
15
There is also information on the relationship between women's education and fertility. 16 Although this data does not provide information about fertility and family education, and hence is not directly relevant to our calibration, it is still instructive to observe the magnitudes of fertility di¤erences they indicate. 17 For the period from 1960 on, Mare [1997] …nds that the gross reproductive rate for white women with high school education or less varies between 1:18 and 1:35 times larger than the gross reproductive rate for white women who have at least some college. For black women the corresponding range is between 1:41 and 1:61. Our data from the PSID suggest di¤erences between high and low type marriages that are roughly in accordance with the range that Mare found for white women. We will investigate the importance of di¤erent fertility pro…les in our sensitivity analysis. 18 Next we consider the choice of the°j's. We have no direct measure of the fraction of children from marriages of di¤erent types that have an aptitude for skill acquisition. From our PSID sample, however, we have data on the relationship between the educational attainments of parents and their children. We …nd that the fraction of children from high-type families that acquire education beyond high school is :81; whereas the values for middle and low-type families are :63 and :30 respectively. In the steady state of our model we require that the ¡ j 's match 15 We could choose the Á nj 's to match the distributions of fertility within each marriage type, but since this does not a¤ect the results we have chosen the simpler procedure. 16 Mare [1997] , for example, tracks this relationship over the period 1920-1990 for both blacks and whites. 17 Average fertility rates have varied considerably over this time period. In our model proportional shifts in fertility are not important, so we focus on relative fertility rates. 18 One factor in favor of considering relatively larger fertility di¤erences is that our model does not allow for the fact that lower income families have their …rst child some …ve years before richer families. This would increase the relative size of the poorer group in steady state by more than what would be predicted based solely on di¤erences in the number of children. See Knowles [1999] for details. these values.
As is evident from equation (12), ¡ j is a function of°j and z j . Thus, the probability that a child from a particular marriage type is of high aptitude (i.e., the°j) can be deduced from the value of ¡ j in conjunction with an assumption about the maximum number of children that the distribution of families of each family type can a¤ord to send to college (i.e., the z nj ) in the steady state. Table I illustrates this mapping by showing the values of the°j's implied by various assumptions regarding the tightness of borrowing constraints subject to the requirement that each (°j; z j ) pair yield the aggregate ¡ j found in the data.
The …rst column of Table I corresponds to a case in which no one is constrainedall high-aptitude children become skilled. In this case the values of ¡ j 's and°j's must coincide. In the remaining columns we consider various scenarios under which low-type families face some credit constraints but the middle and high type families do not. The second column assumes that all low-type families can a¤ord to send at most two children to college. The third column assumes that low-type families with three children su¤er di¤erent constraints than do low type families with two children. Whereas the latter can a¤ord to send two children to college, the former can a¤ord to send only one child to college. Lastly, the fourth column assumes that all low-type families can only a¤ord to send one child to college.
Our analysis, for the most part, is independent of which of these scenarios we take to represent the steady state. If the maximum number of children that di¤erent family types can a¤ord to send to college remains unchanged when the degree of sorting increases, then as equation (15) indicates, the e¤ect of sorting depends only on the ¡ j 's which are given by the data; the mix of°j's and z nj 's used to generate them is irrelevant. It is only when we allow the steady-state equilibrium value of the z nj 's to be a¤ected by the increased degree of sorting that the exact speci…cation might matter. But even in that case all that matters to our results, as will be seen in the next section, is the change in the set of people a¤ected by a tightening of the borrowing constraints, not the number who are initially a¤ected.
We choose the second column of the table for our benchmark speci…cation; i.e., we assume that borrowing constraints do not a¤ect middle and high marriage types, but that low types with three children are able to send at most two of their children to college. This is actually a very mild constraint: since only families who have three children all of whom are high-aptitude are constrained, less than one percent of low-type families are a¤ected. Of course, as outlined in the previous section, it is necessary to check that our assumptions on credit constraints are consistent with wages, consumption requirements and the cost of skill acquisition. We leave this for later in the analysis.
Next we assign a value to µ; the fraction of marriages that are matched perfectly as opposed to at random. Note that this matching procedure implies that µ is equivalent mathematically to the correlation between the education levels of spouses. We use our sample from the PSID to obtain an estimate of this correlation for the US, yielding µ = :6.
Given the values assigned thus far we can solve for b ( the fraction of population that goes to college in the steady state). Doing so, we obtain b = :60 . This turns out to be slightly higher than the corresponding number found in current data as, according to the 1996 CPS roughly 55 percent of individuals aged 25-34 have at least some college. Since average educational attainment in the US continues to increase and our calculation is for the steady state, there is no real inconsistency here, especially as our model abstracts from immigration and childbirth outside of two-parent households.
It remains to specify the production function, for which we choose a constant elasticity of substitution production function:
Note that the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers can be written as1 ¡¯; and that the relative wage of skilled to unskilled workers is given by
(1 ¡¯) ½¡1 : As is well known, the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages has varied considerably over the last 30 years in the US. 19 Recall that our two skill groups are those with at least some college and those with high school or less. Based on the data in Katz and Murphy [1992] , we match a ratio of 1:9 for our benchmark case. This value is at the upper end of what has been observed in the US, so in our robustness check we redo our analysis assuming a ratio of 1.4 and …nd that it has no impact on our results.
There is a literature that attempts to estimate the degree of substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor that we can use to obtain an estimate for ½: The survey by Katz and Autor [1999] suggests that a reasonable range of values for the elasticity is between 1 and 2:5: We match an elasticity of substitution of 1:5 for our benchmark case, which implies ½ = :33. As we will see shortly, the elasticity of substitution is a key parameter for our analysis-if we use a value that is substantially larger, the model generates smaller e¤ects from changes in sorting. We explore the range of values suggested by Katz and Autor in our sensitivity analysis. Our chosen value of ½ and the above-mentioned value for the skill premium implies b = :7135. Lastly, for ease of interpretation of our results, we choose a value of A to scale steady-state unskilled wages to some "reasonable" value, which we set to be 30; 000. This is purely an issue of normalization. 20 Having assigned parameter values, we can solve for the steady state in which educational attainment is dictated by the observed values of the ¡ j 's as discussed previously. We now report some additional properties of this steady state. The model produces a distribution for individual income, with mass at two points, corresponding to the skilled and unskilled wage rates. The standard deviation of log income in the steady state equals :315. Distributions of annual income in the US typically imply a value of around :6 for this …gure. Alternatively, the lifetime income distribution generated by Fullerton and Rogers [1993] using PSID data yields a value around :4. Since we are relying entirely on the skill premium to generate our variation in income it is not surprising that we produce less variation than is found in the data.
Lastly, we can also compute the standard deviation and mean of the educational attainment distribution. We assume that a high-school education corresponds to e = 11:3 and a college education corresponds to e = 15:0, our choice of numbers given by the average educational attainments of children with high school or less and those with college or more in our PSID sample. The resulting standard deviation and mean of the steady state educational attainment distribution are equal to 1:81, and 13:5. For our sample of children from the PSID the corresponding values are 2:56 and 12:9. Given our restriction to two levels of education it is not surprising that we generate less variation than the data. The fact that our mean is somewhat higher is related to the fact that it is the steady-state value.
V. THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED SORTING
We now use the parameterized model to assess the e¤ects associated with an exogenous increase in the degree of sorting in the marriage market. Our objective is to examine whether the concern that some writers have expressed-namely, that increased sorting will lead to increased inequality-has any signi…cant quan-titative support. To this end, we analyze the consequences of increases in sorting corresponding to increases in µ to :7 and :8. Table II displays the results. The …rst column gives the values for the original steady state (i.e., µ = :6). The second column shows what the steady state would be if µ were to increase to :7 and the tightness of borrowing constraints were unchanged (i.e., all high-aptitude children from middle and high-type families could a¤ord to attend college but among low-type families at most two children per household could be sent to college). The third column reports the new steady-state values ensuing from the µ change, but assumes that the wage change associated with this increase tightens constraints for low-type families with three children to the point that they can a¤ord to send at most one of their children to college. 21 The fourth and …fth columns are analogous to the second and third columns except that they correspond to a µ increase to :8. Below we discuss each case in turn, …rst examining those cases in which the borrowing constraints are assumed to be una¤ected by the change in sorting (i.e., columns two and four).
A. Case 1: Set of Borrowing Constrained Individuals Remains Constant
We begin by comparing the …rst column with the second column. This amounts to examining the e¤ects of an increase in sorting from :6 to :7 holding the pattern of college attendance …xed. The …rst three rows report the mean, standard deviation, and coe¢cient of variation for the steady-state distribution of educational attainment. The e¤ect of the increase in sorting is to cause a small decrease in both the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution (less than one percent), and a small increase in the coe¢cient of variation (slightly more than one percent). 22 The decrease in mean educational attainment results from the decrease in the fraction of the population that goes to college; the fourth row shows that the fraction of the population that becomes skilled falls to 59 percent in the new steady state. Although this is a seemingly small decrease, it implies a fall in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers of about 4 percent, as shown in the …fth row. As the next row indicates, this change in relative labor supply induces an increase 21 Later in this section we show that this outcome is consistent with choices for ¹ c and º: 22 Note that since our educational attainment distribution is over two levels, its variance is maximized when the population is evenly distributed across them. Hence, whether a change in b results in an increase or decrease in the standard deviation of education depends entirely upon whether the starting value was above or below .5. Having said this, we think that what is most relevant to notice is that the change in the standard deviation is very small, rather than the direction in which it changes.
in the skill premium of roughly 2:5 percent. 23 The next to last row shows that the standard deviation of the log income distribution increases by almost 5 percent: This is a sizeable increase. By way of comparison, the much publicized increase in wage inequality that took place in the 1980's resulted in roughly a 10 percent increase in the standard deviation of male log weekly wages.
Thus far we have reported properties of the individual income distribution. It is also of interest to examine the changes in the distribution of family income. This distribution changes both because household partners are more correlated and because of the general equilibrium e¤ect this has on wages and on the fraction of the population that becomes skilled. Thus, to decompose the two e¤ects, note that keeping wages and¯constant at their original steady state values, the increase in µ from :6 to :7 itself would increase the standard deviation of log family income by 3:2 percent. Allowing the skill premium and¯to adjust, the increased correlation of household partners yields an increase in the standard deviation of log family income of 8:3 percent. We conclude that both components are important.
The results for the case in which µ increases to :8 follow a pattern similar to the one above. The change in the mean and standard deviation of the education distribution are small, as before. The increase in the skill premium is now greaterapproximately 5 percent, and the increase in the standard deviation of log income is now almost 10 percent relative to the µ = :6 case. This increase is roughly double that found in the case of µ = :7, suggesting that the e¤ect of changes in µ on inequality is close to linear. The increase in the standard deviation of log family income is 16:5 percent, again roughly double the increase found in the previous case.
B. Case 2: Set of Borrowing Constrained Individuals Changes
The preceding analysis assumed that borrowing constraints did not change as a result of the increase in the degree of sorting. As shown in row 7, however, associated with the increase in µ to :7 is a decrease of a bit over $600 in the wages of unskilled workers and hence a decrease in low-type family income of more than $1200. This wage decrease makes it possible that some low-type families will be able to send fewer children to college than previously and hence that the steadystate equilibrium values of z l used in column two are no longer feasible.
In the third column we assume that as a result of the µ increase, in the new steady state low-type families that have three children can a¤ord to send a maximum of one child to college, rather than two (i.e., z 3l = 1); low-type families with two children are assumed to remain unconstrained. This constraint implies that the fraction of children from low-type marriages that go to college to drop from :30 to :2745 (as indicated by the reported values of ¡ l ). The reason that this drop is relatively small is that only 24 percent of low-type families have three children and of these, only some 22 percent have at least two children of high aptitude. As the table shows, the tightening of borrowing constraints has a sizeable e¤ect on how the µ increase a¤ects the income distribution. In particular, although the change in the mean level of education is still relatively small (roughly one percent) and the change in the steady-state equilibrium seemingly not large ( b now equals :568), this implies a drop of almost 15 percent in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers, relative to the µ = :6 case. The skill premium (w s =w u ) also increases by more than 9 percent and the standard deviation of the distribution of log income increases by almost 15 percent. The standard deviation of log family income increases by almost 19 percent.
The …nal column of Table II shows results for the case in which µ increases from :6 to :8 and the increase in the degree to which credit constraints bind is again assumed to reduce ¡ l from :30 to :27. 24 The resulting change in the standard deviation of log income is more than 20 percent. Once again, we note that the change in the mean and standard deviation of the education distribution are still small. For example, the change in mean education is roughly one percent relative to the µ = :6 case.
We next verify that the structural change in college attendance decisions is a feasible equilibrium outcome. We do so only for the case of the change in µ to :7; the change to :8 is similar. In what follows let w u ( b i ) be the unskilled wage rate when the equilibrium value of skilled to unskilled workers, b , is given in column i of Table II. For column 1 to represent an equilibrium steady state, it must be that type l families with three kids can send two but not three children to college. This requires (i) 2º + 5¹ c < 2w u ( b 1 ) < 3º + 5¹ c . 25 For the allocations in column 2 to be infeasible because at those wages l-type families with three kids cannot a¤ord to send two of them to college, requires (ii) 2º + 5¹ c > 2w u ( b 2 ): Lastly, to ensure that the outcome in column 3 is an equilibrium requires checking that it allows type l families with three kids to send one child and type l families with two kids to send two to college. That is, it requires (iii) º + 5¹ c < 2w u ( b 3 ) and (iv) 2º + 4¹ c < 2w u ( b 3 ). Note that if type l families with two kids can a¤ord to send two kids to college then so can type m and h families. Inequalities (ii) and (iii) imply º > 2(w u ( b 2 ) ¡ w u ( b 3 )), so that º > 1; 250 given the numbers in Table  II . There are many combinations of º and ¹ c that satisfy these inequalities. For example, º = 10; 000, and ¹ c = 7; 800. We do not attach too much signi…cance to the magnitudes of º and ¹ c. The simple choices that we made about utility functions and the fact that we abstract from life-cycle income dynamics and the timing of college attendance make us reluctant to do so as does our unwillingness to interpret the borrowing constraints literally as the ability to a¤ord college. The main point of the above paragraph is to establish the logical consistency of our argument that the change in sorting can lead to a change in the extent to which credit constraints bind. It is perhaps not surprising that this can be done, given that we have not imposed any discipline on our choices of ¹ c and º.
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Our analysis thus far has focused on steady states. Given that our model predicts large changes in income inequality it may also be of interest to ask how long it may take for these changes to occur. To pursue this we have solved for the transition path between steady states. Our basic …nding is that the value ofm oves roughly half way to its new steady state value each period. In view of this we conclude that the changes in income inequality that we are …nding are large not only in the steady state but also at small horizons as well. We illustrate this in Table III , which shows the time series for¯and the standard deviation of log income as the economy moves from the µ = :6 steady state to the µ = :7 steady state, assuming no change in the degree to which credit constraints bind. In the table we denote period 0 to be the initial period of the change in the degree of sorting. Since¯is a state variable, it does not respond until the following period.
VI. DISCUSSION
Our results support a conclusion very di¤erent from that reached by Kremer [1997] . Whereas he concluded that a large increase in sorting would have little e¤ect on steady-state inequality given a reasonable parameterization, we have concluded that even moderate changes in the degree of sorting can have sizeable e¤ects on inequality. In this section we analyze what lies behind this di¤erence. Having identi…ed the factors that generate such di¤erent conclusions, we then examine the robustness of our results to di¤erent speci…cations. We …rst turn to a brief review of Kremer's analysis.
Kremer posits an intergenerational model of marriage, fertility and educational attainment in which a child's educational attainment e can be written as a linear function of parental and neighborhood average education. For expositional purposes we consider the argument in the simplest context, and hence abstract from neighborhood e¤ects.
The model assumes that all individuals marry and have two kids. A child's educational attainment is determined by the following linear relationship:
where e i;t+1 is the education level for the child, e i;t and e i 0 ;t are the education levels of the two parents, and " is a normally distributed random shock that is iid across families, with mean 0 and standard deviation equal to ¾ " . An exogenous (assortative) matching of individuals takes place such that ½ m is the correlation between the education levels of parents. Assuming that parameter values are constant over time, the distribution of education will converge to a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation given by
respectively.
Kremer's objective was to determine how changes in sorting among marriage partners (i.e., ½ m ) would a¤ect the level of inequality in the steady state. His main measure of inequality was the standard deviation of educational attainment and he argued that since there is a linear relationship between educational attainment and log of income in the cross-section, that this measure of inequality would probably be a good proxy for inequality in log of income as well. We shall return to this point later.
The e¤ect of an increase in ½ m on the steady state distribution of education can be read o¤ the limiting distribution equations. Because of the assumption of linearity, there is no e¤ect of ½ m on the mean of the distribution of education, but its standard deviation is increasing in ½ m . Obviously, this model is at least qualitatively consistent with the view that increased sorting leads to increased inequality.
Kremer's main contribution, however, was to show that while the model supported this view qualitatively, there was little support for the view that this e¤ect was important quantitatively. As the equation showing the limiting standard deviation makes clear, the percentage change in the standard deviation of income due to a change in the sorting parameter ½ m is determined solely by the magnitude of the parameter ®. Using data from the PSID (the same source that we used to parameterize our model) he obtained an estimate of ® of about :4 and ½ m = :6. 27 In this case, an increase in ½ m from :6 to :8 would result in only a 1 percent increase in the standard deviation of education.
These results, as Kremer showed, are fairly insensitive to the exact value of ® used in this vicinity. The easiest way to see this is by asking how large ® would need to be in order that an increase in ½ m from :6 to :8 to result in a 10 percent increase in the standard deviation of log income. It is easy to show that this requires ® = .84.
Kremer's paper is mainly about the e¤ect of increased neighborhood and marital sorting on the distribution of education. If, however, one takes the view (as Kremer does in his introduction) that log earnings are approximately linear in years of education, and that the coe¢cients in this relationship are invariant to changes in the distribution of education, then the same conclusion applies to inequality in income; a large increase in sorting will not signi…cantly a¤ect income inequality in the US; an increase in martial sorting from :6 to :8 will increase the standard deviation of log income by only 1 percent. It should clear that the results we report in Table II do not contradict Kremer's …nding that sorting has a small impact on the level of inequality in the skill distribution, especially if the increase in sorting does not a¤ect the bindingness of borrowing constraints. To further demonstrate that there is no inconsistency between our results and his we perform his analysis on data generated from our model. Speci…cally, using data generated by the steady-state of our calibrated model (i.e., column 1 in Table 2 ), we take a random sample of 1200 families and run a regression of a child's educational attainment (e i;t+1 ) on a constant and the average educational attainment of its parents (¹ e i;t ). 28 As noted previously, we assume that a high-school education corresponds to e = 11:3 and a college education corresponds to e = 15:0. 29 We do this 100 times and average across the trials. The result of this exercise is: 30 e i;t+1 = 6:69 + :51¹ e i;t It follows that if Kremer had performed his exercise using data generated from our model he would still have reached the same conclusion; i.e., he would have concluded that the coe¢cient on average parental education is too small to matter.
What gives rise to our very di¤erent conclusion about income inequality is the interaction between changes in the skill distribution and the price of skill in our general equilibrium model. This interaction is governed by three elements that are absent in Kremer's analysis but which are central to generating this e¤ect on the price of skill: (i) The existence of a nonlinear relationship between parental years of education and those of their children; (ii) A negative correlation between fertility and parental education; and (iii) Wage rates that are sensitive to changes in the skill distribution. As we shall see, it turns out that if we had only incorporated any one of these three elements, we would have reached the same conclusion as Kremer. 31 But, allowing for the interaction of all three factors (especially (i) and (iii)) leads to a very di¤erent conclusion.
We begin with a discussion of the third factor. The distribution of labor earnings can be thought of as depending on the interaction of two factors. One is the distribution of skill (in our model, education) across individuals, and the second is the price of skill (i.e., the skill premium). As stated in our discussion of Table 2 , the impact of sorting on the level of inequality in the skill distribution is small. In fact, were wages not responsive to the distribution of skills, the change 28 Note that since our model is not linear, it does not lead one to run this regression. We run this regression simply to illustrate how Kremer's analysis would look in our set-up. 29 The speci…c values chosen here a¤ect the constant term in the regression but have very little e¤ect on the coe¢cient on parent's education. 30 Running this regression on our sample from the PSID yields a coe¢cient of .37. This discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that in our model we compress the education distribution to two levels, thereby increasing the correlation between the education levels of parents and their children. We have veri…ed this via simulation. 31 In fact, Kremer considers a markov model in section IV of his paper, and …nds little e¤ect of sorting on the standard deviation of education. This is obviously consistent with our …ndings. We have also rewritten Kremer's model to account for di¤erential fertility and used numerical techniques to compute the steady-state distribution of education. Once again, changes in sorting have little e¤ect on the standard deviation of this distribution.
in the standard deviation of log income would have been around one-half of one percent. What drives our results is that a change in sorting produces a signi…cant change in the skill premium, even if it seemingly does not produce "large" e¤ects on mean educational attainment. As can be seen from a comparison of columns one and two in Table II , a less than one percent decrease in the mean of the education distribution is associated with an almost 4 percent decrease in the relative supply of skilled labor. This translates to a 2:5 percent increase in the wage premium, leading to a signi…cant change in the distribution of income.
To better understand how various elements interact to yield the increase in the skill premium, note …rst that in our model the impact of a change in µ on w s =w u can be decomposed into two distinct e¤ects. The …rst concerns how a given change in µ a¤ects b , and the second with how a given change in b a¤ects w s =w u . This decomposition is useful because college attendance and fertility pro…les are only relevant for the …rst e¤ect, whereas the elasticity of substitution in the production function is only relevant for the second. 32 Consider now the roles of fertility di¤erences and of the function relating parental education to children's education in generating the change in b . Recall from the discussion in Section III that a su¢cient condition for increased sorting to impact negatively on b is for f h ¡ h ¡ 2f m ¡ m + f l ¡ l · 0 and f h ¡ 2f m + f l¸0 (with at least one strict inequality). Our parameter values strictly satisfy both inequalities, guaranteeing that increased sorting will decrease the fraction of the population that attends college. The magnitude of the respective contributions of our fertility pro…le and the concavity of the intergenerational education transmission function will be discussed in the next section on robustness.
One can ask under what conditions our model would give rise to the conclusion that changes in sorting do not have signi…cant e¤ects on the income distribution (without shutting down the e¤ect of changes in skill distribution on wages). A simple condition is given by the combination of a linear relationship between parents' and children's education (i.e., 2¡ m = ¡ h + ¡ l ) and no fertility di¤erentials (i.e., f j = f for all j). But these are precisely the assumptions made by Kremer in his paper-all parents have two kids and the child's years of education are linear in average parental years of education. Thus, had we adopted Kremer's as-sumptions our model would not have generated any e¤ect from increased sorting on the steady-state value of¯, and hence no e¤ect on wage rates or inequality either. Moreover, the fact that wage rates would not have changed would necessarily imply that the bindingness of borrowing constraints would be una¤ected and consequently there would be no scope for any change in college attendance decisions via this channel either.
Lastly, our analysis also suggests that one should exercise caution in interpreting regressions of child's educational attainment on parental educational attainment. In our discussion of Kremer's work, this regression coe¢cient was denoted ® and was treated as a structural parameter that would not be a¤ected by changes in sorting. However, as should be clear from our model, the degree to which education is heritable may di¤er across family types for a variety of reasons including the presence of borrowing constraints. The degree of sorting, as evidenced in the columns three and …ve of Table II, a¤ects the bindingness of borrowing constraints and hence the degree to which parents' education is passed on their children. 33 
VII. ROBUSTNESS
In this section we report how the results from our benchmark model are affected by changes in our parameterization. Our …nding of a quantitatively important increase in income inequality arising from changes in the degree of sorting is robust to reasonable variation in the model's parameterization.
We begin by considering how alternative pro…les for fertility a¤ect our results. Speci…cally, we consider two alternative fertility pro…les. In the …rst, we assume that all families have exactly two children. In the second, we explore the consequences of having greater fertility di¤erences between low type marriages and the other marriages, and hence consider a 25 percent increase in f l to 2:83, keeping f h = 1:84 and f m = 1:90. In each case we recalibrate our model to match the same statistics as before. The comparative statics exercises are the same as in columns two and three in Table III . That is, we examine the e¤ect of an increase in µ from :6 to :7 …rst assuming that the bindingness of constraints is unchanged, and subsequently assuming that they are tightened so as to cause a decrease in ¡ l from :30 to :27. 33 Running a linear regression for the steady state in column three of Table II (using the same procedure described earlier), we obtain .53 rather than the .51 obtained for the scenarios in columns one and two, although the true "heritability" of education is unchanged as re ‡ected in the°j's.
The results are reported in Table IV . The basic message is the same for both of the alternative fertility pro…les. Even with no fertility di¤erences the increase in income inequality is still substantial, albeit somewhat less than in Table II (3:5 percent versus 4:8 percent, with no change in credit constraints and 11:5 percent versus 14:9 percent if ¡ l decreases to :27). For the case in which low-type families have 2:83 kids the increase is 5:3 percent assuming no change in constraints and 16:9 percent if the constraints are tightened. 34 Next we examine how our …ndings are a¤ected by changes in the pro…le of ¡ j 's used in the calibration. Table V shows the e¤ect of varying ¡ m from its value of :63 in our benchmark model. First we examine the consequences of decreasing the degree of concavity in the relationship between parental and children's education to the point where it is linear (¡ m = :555), and then we explore the consequences of increasing the degree of concavity. In each case the production function parameters are recalibrated to match the same statistics as before.
Qualitatively the results are not surprising. As we move closer to the linear case, the increase in the standard deviation of log income caused by an increase in sorting becomes smaller. What is most interesting is the quantitative impact of the increase in sorting when the ¡ pro…le is linear. In this case we still have an increase in the standard deviation of log income that exceeds one percent, assuming no change in credit constraints. This is roughly one quarter of the impact obtained in our benchmark case. Assuming that constraints are tightened on low types (same exercise as in previous tables) then, as reported in the next column, the standard deviation of log income is again more than 10 percent higher. If ¡ m were increased to :68, the increase in the standard deviation of log income is higher by about one and a half percentage points assuming no change in the degree to which credit constraints bind. If this is not true and the e¤ective value of ¡ l decreases to :27 when µ increases to :7, then the increase in inequality is 17 percent.
Given the importance in our analysis of a non-linear relationship between children's and parents schooling, we think it is of interest to document these beyond the markov transition probabilities reported earlier. 35 These regressions are based on our sample of parents and children from the PSID and are run on the reported years of education rather than the two categories we used for our model. 36 Column (1) in this table is the equivalent to column (5) in Table II in Kremer, with basically identical results. What columns (2) and (3) show, however, is that there is strong support for the notion that this relationship is nonlinear. In every speci…cation, all terms are signi…cant at the one percent level. Note that in the cubic speci…cation the second derivative changes from positive to negative at e=12.26. Hence, up to this point there are "increasing returns" to parental education in terms of "producing" child's education, but beyond this point there are "decreasing returns" to parental education. 37 The fact that there are increasing returns in the lower part of the distribution suggests that increased sorting within this part of the distribution may actually increase mean educational attainment within this group. Our analysis abstracts from this issue since it is concerned with the degree of sorting between the top and bottom parts of the income distribution rather than the within group sorting. There we …nd a concave relationship between children and average parental years of education.
We have also investigated this issue in another exercise. Consider the population segmented by four educational attainments-less than high school, high school, some college, and college and above. There are now six types of marriages. We investigate concavity through pairwise comparisons; e.g., we consider two couples, each of which is perfectly matched though the two marriages have di¤erent educational attainments. We then consider what happens to the average educational attainment of children if we turn these two marriages into two mixed marriages, holding the number of kids constant. The only violations of concavity that we …nd are for the cases involving the less than high school group with either the high school or some college group. 38 Hence, these …ndings tell the same story 35 Although Kremer runs a regression that includes the square of parental average education, he also includes the square of average neighborhood education and an interactive term between parental and neighborhood e¤ects. In that regression all variables are statistically insigni…cant, including average parental education. 36 As in Kremer [1997] , individuals with more than 16 years of college are treated as having 17 years of schooling. 37 We have also run regressions by splitting the sample into two groups: parents with average education less than or equal to 12 years, and parents with average education greater than or equal to 12 years. These results con…rmed the above …nding concerning the switch in returns to scale. 38 The same …nding emerged if instead of years of educational attainment we considered the as the above regression analysis-we …nd evidence for concavity except at the lower end of the distribution.
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Our conclusion is also not sensitive to the choice of the value for the wage premium. Although the extent of income inequality in the steady state is a¤ected by this ratio, using values for the wage premium anywhere in the range of 1.4 to 1.9 has virtually no impact on the extent to which the increase in sorting increases the steady-state standard deviation of log income.
Lastly, we consider how our results are a¤ected by considering alternative values for the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. In our benchmark model we assumed a value for this elasticity equal to 1:5 (i.e., ½ = :33). Here we report how our conclusions are a¤ected by assuming values of 1.0 (½ = 0) and 2.5 (½ = :6), since this is the range of estimates suggested by Katz and Autor [1999] . Table VII contains the results, with the …rst column repeating the …ndings from Table II in order to facilitate comparisons. As the change in b (and hence all changes in the distribution of education) is not a¤ected by the value of this elasticity, we only include information on wages and inequality. As expected, the change in the standard deviation of log income is decreasing in this elasticity, but even for ½ = :6 the resulting change is still substantial-more than 3 percent with no change in the extent to which credit constraints bind and almost 10 percent if low-type families become more constrained.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the e¤ects of increased assortative matching in marriage. We constructed a dynamic model of education acquisition and parameterized it to US data. Using this calibrated model, we conclude that an increase in sorting is likely to have quantitatively signi…cant e¤ects on the degree of income inequality. Although our conclusion holds even in the absence of imperfect borrowing markets, if borrowing constraints exist and are tightened as a result of the increase in sorting, this will magnify the increase in inequality.
The factors that contribute to our obtaining this conclusion are: a negative correlation between fertility and education; a decreasing marginal e¤ect of parental probability of obtaining at least some college or the probability of …nishing college. These results are of interest since they are not a¤ected by the fact that years of schooling are e¤ectively bounded above. 39 Other researchers have also found evidence for nonlinearities in the relationship between the earnings of parents and children. See, for example, Cooper, Durlauf and Johnson [1993] , and Corak and Heisz (1999) . education on children's years of education; a process of wage determination that is sensitive to the relative supply of skilled to unskilled workers; the potential tightening in borrowing constraints.
Our model interpreted borrowing constraints as high-aptitude individuals unable to borrow to cover the cost of obtaining a college education. We do not take this interpretation literally. An alternative formulation would be to assume that a child's aptitude is determined jointly by parental educational attainment and the resources that they devote to the child's development (for example the quality of K-12 education the child obtains). If parents are unable to borrow against their child's future income to provide them with greater schooling resources, parental income is again a factor determining investment in a child's future education. This alternative interpretation does not require borrowing constraints to be operative at the time a person decides whether to attend college. Children who grow up in poor families will be less likely to attend college, not because they cannot obtain a loan to …nance their college education, but because they have had lower quality K-12 educations and are less able to bene…t from a college education.
One important question we have ignored in our analysis is how sorting is determined. 40 How and why does sorting di¤er across time and across countries? Sorting is undoubtedly a complex process that depends among many thing, on income di¤erentials, on the degree of sorting in other spheres of society such as residence or schools, on the functioning of networks. Furthermore, it may well exhibit multiple equilibria since the desire to match with a certain type may depend on the sorting behavior of others. In recent work, Fernández, Guner, and Knowles [2000] and Fernández and Pissarides [2000] endogenize sorting and fertility and examine the links with inequality. If, as seems reasonable to assume, lower family income leads to greater fertility, and greater wage di¤erentials lead to more e¤ort to match with higher-income individuals, we conjecture that these would serve to reinforce our conclusions. Thus, any change that served to increase wage di¤erentials (e.g., skill-biased technological change) or reduce search costs for partners (e.g., internet dating) would set o¤ a process that would exacerbate the original increased wage inequality or original increase in assortative mating. It would also be of interest in future work to take into account how di¤erences in 40 Becker [1973] is the classic static model of marriage. See, for example, Burdett and Coles [1997] and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite [1992] for models that endogenize the degree of marital sorting and Fernández and Galí [1999] for a model that incorporates borrowing constraints into the matching process. Recent work by Greenwood, Guner and Knowles [1999] provides a computational analysis that endognizes fertility, marriage, divorce, and the bargaining power of males and females.
gender or attitudes towards it may a¤ect sorting and hence inequality.
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